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ABSTRACT
Adaptive security systems aim to protect valuable assets in the
face of changes in their operational environment. They do so by
monitoring and analysing this environment, and deploying security
functions that satisfy some protection (security, privacy, or forensic)
requirements. In this paper, we suggest that a key characteristic
for engineering adaptive security is the topology of the operational
environment, which represents a physical and/or a digital space -
including its structural relationships, such as containment, proxim-
ity, and reachability. For adaptive security, topology expresses a
rich representation of context that can provide a system with both
structural and semantic awareness of important contextual charac-
teristics. These include the location of assets being protected or the
proximity of potentially threatening agents that might harm them.
Security-related actions, such as the physical movement of an actor
from a room to another in a building, may be viewed as topological
changes. The detection of a possible undesired topological change
(such as an actor possessing a safe’s key entering the room where
the safe is located) may lead to the decision to deploy a particular
security control to protect the relevant asset. This position paper
advocates topology awareness for more effective engineering of
adaptive security. By monitoring changes in topology at runtime
one can identify new or changing threats and attacks, and deploy
adequate security controls accordingly. The paper elaborates on the
notion of topology and provides a vision and research agenda on its
role for systematically engineering adaptive security systems.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.10 [Software Engineering]: Design; S.9.1 [Security and Pri-
vacy]: Software Security Engineering
General Terms
Security, Design
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1. INTRODUCTION
Engineering self-adaptive systems that continue to satisfy their
security [17, 20], privacy [13] and forensic requirements [14] - here-
after collectively referred to as adaptive security systems - has been
recently recognised as an important challenge to be addressed by
the software engineering community. Adaptive security systems
aim to protect valuable assets in the face of changes in their opera-
tional environment. Adaptive security is supported by monitoring
and analysing the system operational environment, and deploying
security controls that satisfy some protection (security, privacy, or
forensic) requirements. Relevant characteristics of the operational
environment of a system are invariably many and hard to determine
and monitor. We suggest that a key characteristic is the topology
of the operational environment - its structure in terms of the key
elements and their relationships that determine the shape of the
environment. In a physical sense, a topology denotes the physical
characteristics of a space, such as size, adjacency, and connectivity,
and is often represented as a map or physical model. In a digital
sense, a topology often denotes structural characteristics of informa-
tion, such as logical relationships between entities in an information
model. In both cases, structural relationships are key, such as hi-
erarchy, containment, proximity and reachability. Indeed, with the
increasing expectations that systems are cyber physical, topology,
we claim, can provide an important representation of context.
For adaptive security, topology can provide a system with both
structural and semantic awareness of important contextual charac-
teristics. These might include the location of assets being protected
and the security controls that should be enacted in their close prox-
imity. For example, a possible way to secure a sensitive document
may be only to grant to a restricted set of trustworthy users permis-
sions to access the room where the machine storing the document
is placed. Moreover, the location of human and digital agents can
also determine potential threats, which can harm the assets located
in their vicinity. For example, the presence of a person in a room
can represent a threat as she can steal any valuable asset placed in
the areas reachable from her current location.
Changes in the topology due to movements of assets or agents
can affect system security concerns, and indeed render existing se-
curity controls no longer effective. For example, the movement of
a physical asset to a new location, may require applying stronger
security controls on the area in which the asset is currently placed.
Similarly, in a cloud infrastructure, the allocation of a new virtual
machine (VM) used by a premium customer may require applying
additional patches on the hosting physical machine. In these sce-
narios, a live representation of the topology at runtime can provide
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Figure 1: Topology types.
valuable contextual indicators as to where and when a system needs
to deploy particular security controls to protect the relevant assets.
The role of topology [19] has been investigated in several do-
mains that are not directly related to software engineering. In the
wireless sensor networks community topology was not only used
for sensor area placement, but also in the context of security. For ex-
ample, adaptation in sensor network clustering in response to spam
attacks has been proposed. However, existing context modelling
techniques [4] do not explicitly capture the topology of the system
operational environment. This position paper advocates topology
awareness for more effective engineering of adaptive security. It
clarifies the meaning of topology and its impact on the system se-
curity concerns and suggests that monitoring changes in topology
and reasoning about their possible consequences at runtime can help
identify new or changing threats and attacks, and deploy adequate
security controls accordingly.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces
the notion of topology and explains how it can affect the identifi-
cation of relevant security concerns. Sections 3, 4, 5 illustrate the
research challenges topology brings for engineering adaptive secu-
rity, privacy and digital forensics. Section 6 concludes the paper by
providing future research questions to be addressed by the security
engineering and the self-adaptive systems communities.
2. TOPOLOGY
This section provides a definition of topology and illustrates it
with examples of physical and digital spaces. Finally, it explains
how topology awareness can impact on the identification of security
concerns such as assets, threats, attacks and vulnerabilities that are
crucial for the selection of appropriate security controls.
2.1 Definition
Topology refers to the study of shapes and spaces, including prop-
erties such as connectedness and boundary [9]. A representation
of the topology identifies the structure of space and the location of
objects and agents in that space. A physical topology represents the
location of physical agents (e.g., humans, robots) and objects in a
physical environment (e.g., a building) and their structural relation-
ships (e.g., agents-objects proximity). A digital topology represents
the configuration of a virtual environment, such as a network, which
may be composed of nodes (e.g., physical and virtual machines),
including their hardware and software configuration and network
connections. Topologies may include intangible areas such as ad-
ministrative domains, where different security regulations apply.
Both physical and digital topologies can also represent different
kinds of relationships among the elements they represent such as
containment, proximity, and reachability.
The proliferation of cyber physical systems is increasingly blur-
ring the boundary between physical and digital topologies. On the
one hand, digital objects, such as electronic files, can be stored on a
desktop accessible in a physical space. On the other hand, physical
objects, such as domestic appliances, can be accessed from digital
objects, such as software applications. Even though architectural
models for cyber physical systems have been proposed [3], they do
not support reasoning on how changes in the topology can affect rel-
evant security concerns and select security controls able to mitigate
emerging security threats determined by such changes.
2.2 Example
Figure 1a shows a representation of the physical topology of a
corporate building that is composed of rooms R1, R2 and R3. This
topology also represents physical objects, such as lab equipment
(e.g., microscope M) and a desktop (D) that are located in rooms R2
and R3, respectively, and human agents such as a visitor (V) and
an employee (E). In this example, a containment relationship exists
if an area contains objects/agents (e.g., room R1 contains agents V
and E, or the building belongs to a specific department). A proxim-
ity relationship identifies the distance between two agents/objects
or whether these are simply co-located in the same area. In this
example, a visitor is co-located with an employee. A reachability
relationship expresses if an agent can access another area or reach
an object from a specific location. For example, room R2 can be
accessed by the employee and the visitor who are in room R1, or M
can be reached by those agents who are in room R2. For a physical
topology, accessibility always requires agents-objects proximity.
Figure 1b shows a representation the digital topology of a vir-
tualised network infrastructure. Objects can be physical machines
(M1, M2), virtual machines (VM1, ... VM7), available or estab-
lished network connections, applications and processes installed on
physical and virtual machines, and files stored on these machines.
Agents here represent users who are locally or remotely logged
on the physical and virtual machines. A containment relationship
represents applications/files installed/stored on physical machines,
or can delimit the countries in which physical machines are located.
For example, M1 and M2 are located respectively in Europe and in
the USA. Containment relationships can also represent the fact that
a user is running a particular application. For example the admin on
M2 is running VMWare. The concept of proximity here represents
the fact that different virtual machines, such as VM1, ..., VM4, are
hosted on the same physical machine. Finally, reachability denotes
the fact that an agent can access a physical or a virtual machine, by
establishing a local or remote connection, or that a user can run a
specific application/process because she has the permissions to do so.
For example, the admin on M2 can access M1 because M1 accepts
incoming network connections from M2, or the admin at the hosting
company can locally access M1 - if she is physically co-located
with M1. Moreover some of the applications/files installed/stored
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Figure 2: Adaptive security scenario for the physical topology example.
on M1 are accessible to user1 if there exists the relevant permission
to execute/access them.
Note that there are a few differences between physical and digital
topologies. Unlike physical spaces, in digital spaces reachability
does not always require proximity because, for example, a machine
can also be accessed remotely. Furthermore, while in physical
topologies containments are well delimited, this is not always the
case for digital topologies, where, for example, accessing a virtual
machine does not require access to the physical machine hosting it.
Finally, unlike physical topologies, in digital topologies an agent
can reach different places at the same time. For example, the same
agent can be in different processes or files, when it executes different
processes or access different files at the same time.
2.3 Topology Awareness
Taking into account the topology of an operational environment
can radically change the way we identify security concerns for engi-
neering secure systems. Firstly, knowing where valuable assets are
placed and their relationships with other objects in their proximity
is crucial to identify possible security controls that can be enacted
to protect them. For the physical topology shown in Figure 1a, secu-
rity controls deal with identifying authentication and authorisation
mechanisms to be put in place in some of the areas that need to be
accessed to harm an asset. For example, to protect the microscope
located in room R2, authentication and authorisation permissions for
certain personnel must be applied to regulate access to R2. Likewise,
digital assets such as F1 and F2, can be read or modified unlawfully
depending on their accessibility in the physical space of the device
on which they are stored (desktop D). In this case, possible security
controls can regulate authorisation rights to read the document on
D, or authentication and authorisation permission to log on to D or
to access room R3 where D is located. Security controls can also
enforce the relocation of assets to more secure areas. For example,
M can be moved to another area (e.g., room R3) where access is
restricted to trusted people.
Other security concerns, such as vulnerabilities, threats and at-
tacks, can also depend on the locations of human and software
agents, who can harm valuable assets placed in their vicinity. Vul-
nerabilities can be considered as capabilities offered by a physical
or digital object, which can be exploited to harm an asset. The
current topology state can give an indication of when a vulnerability
can be exploited, for example, if an is agent is co-located with the
same vulnerable object and has the capability to exploit it. Threats
can arise from malicious agents, while attack vectors represent the
possible sequences of actions that can be performed by an agent to
harm an asset depending on the topology structure and relationships.
For the example in Figure 1a, a threat may arise from a malicious
visitor who can damage M by accessing room R2. Accessibility
to room R2 from R1 is the exploited vulnerability. A visitor can
also access confidential documents (e.g., F1) stored on D, if she
enters in R3, logs on to C, and reads F1. Threat detection may lead
to identifying possible security controls. For example, if a visitor
inadvertently accesses an area where a valuable asset is located, she
should be made to leave by a human or electronic guard.
For the digital topology shown in Figure 1b, assets to be protected
can be virtual machines (e.g., those adopted by premium customers),
as well as sensitive data that is stored and/or transmitted in the
network. Threats and attacks directly depend on the configuration of
physical and virtual machines from which the assets under protection
can be reached. Threats can be malicious users, while potential
attacks are determined by all possible ways in which an attacker
can access the data or the VMs under protection by exploiting
existing open ports and software vulnerabilities. For example, a
threat scenario can revolve around an administrator at the hosting
company, who can login on M1 locally and copy the image of the
hosted virtual machines. Alternatively, a malicious attacker from
M2 can exploit a vulnerability in the operating system installed on
M1 to perform a buffer overflow attack targeting M1.
In this domain, security controls can modify access rights to data
and VMs under protection, selectively apply patch updates to soft-
ware installed on physical and virtual machines to fix vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by potential attackers, dynamically modify
firewall configurations, or forbid incoming network connections
from specific hosts. Note that security controls can also be applied
on machines that are not directly under protection and from which
the assets to be protected are still reachable. For the example of Fig-
ure 1b, security controls can be applied on M1 to forbid incoming
network connections from M2 or by patching the installed software
to remove vulnerabilities. Alternatively, security controls can be
applied to fix vulnerabilities in the software installed on M2, which
can be exploited by an attacker to compromise M2 and remotely
connect to M1. Finally, security controls can also enforce the re-
location of virtual machines to more secure domains in which the
foreseen attacks are no longer feasible.
3. ADAPTIVE SECURITY
Adaptive security [17] aims to continue to protect valuable assets
from harm, even when security concerns change dynamically. To
prevent potential attacks, security controls are adjusted at runtime
depending on the varying risk of harm. In this section we discuss
the implications that topology has on adaptive security by using the
examples outlined in Section 2.2.
Topology changes can render an existing security configuration
no longer effective. For a physical topology, moving a valuable
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Figure 3: Adaptive security scenario for the digital topology example.
asset (e.g., microscope M) to a room (e.g., R3) may require enabling
stronger access control mechanisms to the rooms/areas in which the
asset is enclosed. Additionally, unexpected agents’ movements may
add new threats, as they can harm the assets that can be reached
from their current location, which must be mitigated. For example,
if a visitor accesses room R3 because she is accompanied by an
authorised employee (see Figure 2, state S1) the authentication and
authorisation mechanisms used to protect the assets in R3 may no
longer be effective because in a future state (S3) a visitor can log on
to desktop D and access the confidential files stored in it (F1).
To discover potential attacks caused by topological changes, it
is necessary to reason about the actions that potentially malicious
agents can perform to harm valuable assets, by exploiting the con-
figuration of a physical space. For example, Figure 2 represents
an attack scenario that can take place from state S1, when a visitor
enters in room R3 together with an authorised employee. Note that
each state transition is determined by an action changing the topol-
ogy’s structure and relationships (e.g., agents/assets movements,
opened files). Different security controls can be identified (see
dashed lines in Figure 2) by exploring the state space of the possi-
ble topology configurations. A possible solution is to prevent the
system from reaching state S2 (i.e. a visitor accesses desktop D),
for example, by applying stronger authentication mechanisms on D.
Another solution is to force the system to reach a state from which
the state associated with a security breach is more distant - in terms
of number of state transitions. For example, a security control can
force the vistor to leave room R3 (see state S2.b).
For a digital topology, the allocation of a new VM to a poten-
tially malicious customer may cause harm to other customers who
use VMs co-hosted on the same physical machine because covert
channel attacks can be attempted. Changes in the network and soft-
ware configuration of physical and virtual machines can add new
vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by existing known attack
modules. For example, if a system administrator at the hosting com-
pany downgrades the VMWare version installed on M1 to version
6.x for licensing reasons (see Figure 3, state S1), an existing vulner-
ability1 allows a local user to gain root privileges by setting a library
path option in a configuration file. Consequently, this user will
be authorised to make copies of a target VM image hosted locally
(state S3). Potential security controls can be identified by preventing
a system from moving to state S2, by revoking the permission to
modify the VMWare configuration file causing the vulnerability.
Another possible option could be to force the system to rollback to a
previous state, for example, by forcing the administrator to upgrade
VMWare to a version greater than 6.x.
These scenarios require explicit support of “topology-awareness”
in the activities of the MAPE (Monitoring, Analysis, Planning,
Executing) loop [10] necessary for adaptive security, and topology
should be conceived as a live entity at runtime. Topology-relevant
1http://www.cvedetails.com/cve/ CVE-2008-0967/
changes, such as movements of software and human agents or VM
re-locations, must be monitored and used to estimate the impact on
related security concerns, such as potential threats and attacks and
applicable security controls. Analysis techniques, similar to those
intuitively explained in Figure 2 and Figure 3 must be provided
to reason about potentially harmful scenarios that are feasible in
the future states of a system and can harm a set of assets under
protection. Similarly, planning techniques should allow identifying
actions that prevent the system to move to an harmful state, or force
rollback to a state in which the harmful scenario is no loger plausible.
Finally the effects of the execution phase, modifying the topology
or restricting the available movements that agents can perform, must
also be synchronised with the current representation of the topology.
Fuzzy causal networks have been recently adopted in previous
work [17] to adaptively re-estimate security risk when asset-relevant
changes take place, and to identify a suitable configuration of se-
curity controls to apply at runtime. However, previous work does
not take into account topological changes as a trigger for risk re-
estimation and adaptation. To overcome this limitation, formalisms
such as spatial logics [1] can be used to express properties on the
topological conformation of the operational environment in order to
formally define harmful states that a system must never reach. In
addition, existing calculi such as pi-calculus [12] or ambient calcu-
lus [8], can be employed to reason about a set of potential states
that a system can reach to mitigate existing threats. As far as we are
aware, existing model checking techniques [5, 6, 7] that use these
formalisms have only been employed to verify security policies but
they have not been adopted to assess security risks or to suggest
possible security controls that can be applied in specific situations.
Another challenge to support adaptive security is the need to
perform analysis and planning activities efficiently at runtime. To
deal with the complexity of risk assessment for large and distributed
topologies, such as those representing cloud infrastructures or smart
cities, it is possible to reduce the analysis space by using the notion
of topology itself. Containment relationships allow identifying only
specific areas of the problem space in which the reasoning must
be performed. For example, the reasoning could focus only on
potential threats that can harm assets located in the areas affected
by a change. Another possibility is to only perform the reasoning
up to a maximum number of subsequent actions (e.g., movements
in a physical topology or execution of attack modules in a virtual
topology) attackers can use to harm assets under protection. A
combination of these strategies could also be used.
4. ADAPTIVE PRIVACY
Adaptive privacy [13] aims to continue to protect personal and
sensitive information from unauthorised collection, storage, use, and
transmission. To prevent potential privacy breaches, suitable actions
that regulate the level of information disclosed are suggested to a
user at runtime depending on the varying risk of harm and the social
benefits deriving from the disclosure.
In the privacy domain, the main asset to be protected is personal
information, which may be stored on digital files (e.g., text files,
pictures) or can be inferred from the users’ interaction with digital
devices (e.g., sensors tracking users’ location or movements). Pri-
vacy threats cause harm to an individual or to a group of people who
are related to the content of the information disclosed. Therefore,
estimating privacy risks depends on the negative consequences that
disclosing information can have on its subjects. Social benefits deriv-
ing from the disclosure also need to be traded-off with privacy risks
in order to provide appropriate suggestions on whether to selectively
disclose a specific piece of information.
Taking into account the topology of the operational environment
can radically change the way we identify privacy concerns. Firstly,
topology can have a direct impact on the sensitivity of an infor-
mation item. For example, location information, which at a first
glance is not perceived as sensitive, may topologically be related to
additional information that actually is very sensitive. For example,
location information implying proximity to potentially embarrassing
places (e.g., nightclubs) is more sensitive than location information
revealing proximity to a person’s workplace. Topology can also de-
termine privacy threats. In particular, agents co-located in the same
physical space with an individual may represent a threat because
they can potentially intercept the information she is disclosing. For
example, a threat scenario may revolve around a person providing
as input to her mobile device the password of her bank account in
close proximity to unknown people. Furthermore, the recipients of
an information item transmitted by a person can determine a threat
scenario if one of them re-transmits this information to some of
her contacts. Another threat scenario may revolve around a person
sharing a sensitive picture with her social network friends; in case
one of her friends in turn shares the picture with friends of friends,
this may lead to a privacy violation.
Topology changes can affect sensitivity of information and bring
new threats, rendering existing disclosure interactions more or less
harmful. A person’s movements can affect sensitivity of disclosed
information. For example, location information can become more
sensitive when a person moves to specific locations (e.g., to a hospi-
tal, because it can reveal an individual’s health issues). Additionally,
privacy threats can arise from agents’ movements. For example, if
an agent comes in close proximity to a person when she is providing
the password of her bank account, this password has a higher chance
to be intercepted. Changes in the connections topology of a person’s
social network contact can also bring new threats. For example, con-
sider the scenario in which a person’s contact (Alice’s contact Bob)
adds to the network of his friends another contact (Charlie, who is
Alice’s work colleague). In this case, when Alice shares some of
her personal information to her social network contacts potential
threats can arise. This is due to the fact that shared information can
potentially be received by undesired recipients (Charlie), because
Bob can share Alices’ information with his contacts.
All these scenarios require explicit support of “topology-aware-
ness” in the activities of the MAPE loop to support adaptive pri-
vacy. Monitoring must detect topological changes at runtime to
re-estimate privacy concerns, such as sensitivity of disclosed infor-
mation and new/changing agents behaviours enabled by topological
changes. Potential solutions could benefit from existing studies in
ubiquitous computing and human factors [11] to better understand
privacy concerns of users sharing information in relation to their
topological context. Analysis may be triggered by acts of infor-
mation disclosure to assess its potential threats on users’ privacy.
Existing work on adaptive privacy [13] detects privacy threats by
checking violation of privacy requirements over behavioural models
of system agents. However, we are not aware of any work to identify
variations in agents’ potential behaviours that can be determined
by changes in topology. Such work could help understand how
topological changes can dynamically bring new/different privacy
breaches. Planning must identify different levels of information
disclosure that a user can enable, and associate each of them with
potential threats (e.g., which recipients does a specific information
disclosure reach). This will guide users to decide how to store,
insert, and transmit their personal information. Execution differs
from its security counterpart since it is mainly the responsibility of
the user to select and enact a specific level of information disclosure
depending on the suggestions given by the planning.
Existing privacy laws and standards regulating the treatment of
personal information by external parties also depend on where in-
formation resides. For the example shown in Figure 1b, physical
machines M1 and M2 are located in Europe and in the USA respec-
tively, where completely different privacy regulations apply. The
European Data Protection Directive2 grants users the right to both
remove and correct any personal information online. In contrast,
in the USA customers do not have the same rights of controlling
their own information online, except for medical records [2]. Thus,
location of information determines the actions that are permitted by
the law for the handling of personal data, and topology awareness
can therefore help identify privacy breaches if regulations being in
force do not comply with citizens’ privacy requirements.
Topology awareness in adaptive privacy can also provide tangible
benefits in maintaining privacy requirements when customers out-
source part of their services to the cloud. Topology changes, such as
VMs re-location or data replication, may cause movements of infor-
mation to a different jurisdiction where users’ privacy requirements
may no longer be satisfied. In this scenario, topology awareness
may help support the novel notion of adaptive compliance, which
aim to identify changing jurisdictions and apply adequate adaptation
actions to maximise the satisfaction of customer’ privacy require-
ments. To support adaptive compliance, it is necessary to identify
formal techniques (e.g., deontic logic [18]) to represent customers’
privacy requirements and privacy regulations being in force in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. Monitoring should support data provenance and
track the jurisdictions where information resides. Analysis should
use verification techniques (e.g., [15]) to check customers’ privacy
requirements. If some of these requirements cannot be satisfied,
planning should identify suitable adaptation strategies (e.g., VMs
and storage re-location), and, if no strategy is suitable, customers
must be notified of the privacy breaches and have the possibility to
re-negotiate their contract with the service provider.
5. ADAPTIVE DIGITAL FORENSICS
A software engineering challenge in digital forensics is to build
systems that are forensic-ready [16], which are able to support the
potential collection and use of digital evidence. To assess how a
crime (i.e. a security breach) was perpetrated, such systems must
perform targeted evidence collection, perhaps even before a crime
takes place. This is fundamental especially when evidence is volatile,
as it may no longer be available subsequently. Indeed, evidence
can be concealed by potential attackers or can come from volatile
sources (e.g. volatile storage). Evidence ephemerality is also a
typical problem of cloud infrastructures, which provide an ’elastic’
environment, where storage and computing resources are provided
and released on demand. Therefore evidence can be lost if it is not
preserved adequately.
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Collecting all possible evidence proactively is not a viable solu-
tion, since it can be very voluminous and cumbersome to analyse.
Instead, evidence collection activities must only focus on gathering
the data necessary to investigate potential attacks that can exploit
the current system configuration. In this scenario, adaptive digital
forensics [14] aims to continue to support forensic-readiness even
when potential attacks change due to modifications of the external
operational environment. As demonstrated in section 3, topology
changes can modify the actions that can be performed by an attacker
to generate security breaches. Moreover, knowing potential attacks
in advance can allow us to focus evidence collection activities only
on those assets and locations exploited by an attacker, and avoid
collecting evidence from all possible sources.
We suggest that topology awareness should be considered for
engineering the activities of the MAPE loop to support adaptive
digital forensics. As with adaptive security, monitoring and anal-
ysis must track topology-relevant changes, such as movements of
software and human agents or VMs re-location, and estimate their
impact on related security concerns, such as potential threats and
attacks. For each potential attack, the planning activity must iden-
tify suitable strategies to preserve the evidence coming from the
digital objects whose vulnerabilities are exploited to perpetrate an
attack. Execution must enable evidence collection activities identi-
fied during planning, and disable those that are no longer necessary,
because an attack is no longer feasible. For the scenario shown in
Figure 2, when a system unexpectedly moves to state S1, evidence
collection activities will monitor users’ logins on desktop D and
read/write/copy/delete operations performed on file F1, whose in-
tegrity must be preserved. For the scenario shown in Figure 3, if
a system moves unexpectedly to state S1, accesses of a user to a
VMWare configuration file (VM_Conf) that can be manipulated to
perform an attack must be monitored together with all VMWare
operations aimed to perform copies of the VM images hosted locally.
6. AN EMERGING RESEARCH AGENDA
This position paper has provided our vision for the use of topol-
ogy for engineering adaptive security systems, and demonstrated -
by utilising examples of physical and digital spaces - how topology
awareness can help engineer more effective adaptive security. We
believe several research questions emerged from our paper that the
self-adaptive system community could address. Firstly, it is neces-
sary to identify appropriate formalisms (e.g., [8, 12]) to represent
topology and track its changes at runtime. Secondly, analysis tech-
niques must be further investigated to understand how topological
changes affect security and privacy concerns. To achieve this aim,
model checking of spatial properties could be a suitable way to
identify potential attacks that can exploit the topology of the opera-
tional environment. Moreover, planning techniques are needed to
generate adaptation actions that can prevent or mitigate security and
privacy breaches determined by topological changes. In particular,
planning could take into account adaptation costs (penalisation of
other non-security requirements) and benefits (risk mitigation). Both
planning and analysis can exploit the topology of the surrounding
environment to reduce the state space, thus leading to more effi-
cient adaptation at runtime. We hope both the security engineering
and the self-adaptive systems communities will find the research
questions and challenges highlighted in this paper useful in order to
achieve more effective adaptive security.
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